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Abstract
This paper reports on the socioeconomic status of Arabs and how attitudes toward them vary
between France and the United States. It is intended to illuminate the French perspective toward
Arabs to an American audience while comparing it to the American perspective. Arabs hold a
lower socioeconomic status in France than in America. They are frequently targeted by French
policy, which has formerly aimed to repatriate them but now focuses on assimilating them. In
America, Arabs face less cultural oppression, but more political exclusion. Because Americans
prize independence as opposed to community, Arabs have more freedom to retain their home
cultures; however Americans are hostile to perceived opposition to government and fear an Arab
link to terrorism. Thus, while the French and Americans both fear Arabs, the French perceive
Arabs as symbolic threats to French culture, while Americans perceive Arabs as militant
opponents.
Introduction
In international relations today, one of the biggest issues is the troubled relationship
between the Arab world and the West. France and the United States, two prominent powers of
the West, have each recently had high-profile problems with Arabs both within and outside of
their borders. The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 brought American relations with
Arabs to the world’s attention. However, France’s history with the Arab world has a far more
extensive past than that of the U.S, dating to its colonial era; in addition, its internal conflicts
have received much more media attention. In the past two decades, France has been the object of
international attention due to its debate over Islamic headscarves and the violence in its banlieue
(low-income, high-crime suburbs where high concentrations of minorities are found).
For some Americans, it can be hard to fully understand the racial and cultural tensions due
to differences in French and American cultural perspectives. Americans feel in some ways able
to relate to the French perspective because the U.S. also has a past of deeply troubled race
relations. In other ways, French actions can baffle Americans. For example, most Americans
would have serious reservations about banning the hijab (an Islamic garment which covers a
woman’s hair and neck) in schools or the niqab (an Islamic garment which covers the entire
body except the eyes) and burqa (an Islamic garment which covers the entire body) in public, as
the French have done. It is useful to compare the situations of France and the U.S. concerning
Arab relations because the two states are similar in many ways, including their foreign policy
toward Arab states; however they differ widely regarding Arabs within their borders and how
they are viewed (Scott 1-12). To shed light on the French perspective for an American audience,
this paper includes a description of French public policy affecting Arabs and the socioeconomic
problems facing Arabs in France. It also includes a comparison between U.S. and French policies.
The goal of this paper is to elucidate the American and French racial and cultural tensions and
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provide suggestions to address these issues.
For this paper, it is important to be clear about the terms used. In everyday usage, “Arab” is
not a well-defined or well-understood word. Some people use it to refer to people from the
Middle East; others define Arabs as anyone who speaks Arabic; still others consider it
synonymous with “Muslim.” For the purposes of this paper, Arab is defined as anyone of
Egyptian, Sudanese, Somali, Libyan, Tunisian, Algerian, Moroccan, Mauritanian, Syrian,
Jordanian, Palestinian, Lebanese, Iraqi, Saudi Arabian, Yemenite, Kuwaiti, Qatari, Omani,
Bahraini, or United Arab Emirates ancestry; these countries are all in the Arab League (Nigem
629). This, of course, is not a homogeneous group since people from these states have different
dialects, religions, and histories (Salaita 6). However, over time they have come to be grouped
together into the loose cultural identity of “Arab.”
In France, most Arabs originate from the Maghreb, which refers to Northwest Africa
(Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania); in particular, large numbers of Arabs are
from Algeria. While not all Arabs are Muslim, Islam is a central element of Arab culture. Since
Arabs are the largest non-European immigrant group in France, and the conversion rate of
Europeans to Islam is low, most Muslims in France are Arab. There are some Muslim
immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, but in much smaller numbers. Therefore, issues of
discrimination against Islam and its followers are connected with discrimination against Arabs.
Literature Review
2. Socioeconomic status of Arabs in France
2.1 Unemployment
The economic status of Arabs in France has consistently been lower than that of non-Arab
French citizens. When Arabs first began immigrating to France in large numbers to replenish the
labor force, they were generally employed in low-skill, low-paying jobs. The French viewed
Arabs as short-term replacements for French workers, and when the need for immigrant labor
decreased after the wars, Arabs were then viewed as reserve labor. It was generally understood
by French citizens that these reserve labor forces were supposed to continue to supplement labor
when needed, and disappear otherwise. The French did not realize that most Arabs were settling
permanently in France, which contributed to the animosity between the groups when
unemployment rose in the 1970s. Because Arabs were only intended to be reserve labor, the
French believed that Arabs were stealing their jobs (Hargreaves, Immigration 40-56).
Arabs and other immigrant groups in France have consistently experienced higher
unemployment rates than non-immigrant groups. Immigrants from Asia and Africa have much
higher unemployment rates than immigrants from other states of the EU (Hargreaves,
Immigration 40-45). According to Hargreaves, unemployment is highest (20-25%) among people
who move to France from countries outside the European Economic Area or individuals who are
descendants of these groups. Though data do not specify unemployment rates by country of
origin, given other data sources regarding unemployment rates among Arabs, it seems evident
that a large portion of France’s non-EEA immigrants is comprised of Arabs. In addition,
immigrants and their descendants who relocate from the EEA experience unemployment rates
(roughly 9.5%) almost identical to those of non-immigrant French citizens. For immigrants who
relocate from outside the EEA, whether or not they have officially become French citizens, the
unemployment rates are more than double those of the native French.
More recent data indicate that the highest unemployment rates in 2010 (24.2%) were
experienced by the descendants of non-EEA immigrants; in other words, they are comprised of
immigrants’ children and grandchildren, all of whom had been born and raised in France
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(Bouvier 1-4). This suggests that racism is a factor in their unemployment. The high
unemployment rate for this group is a significant cause for the discontent felt by many beurs, or
second-generation Arabs in France.
Further analysis of the unemployment rates among non-EEA immigrants in France
confirms that Arabs suffer much higher jobless rates than most other immigrant groups. From
2007 to 2010, unemployment rates were the highest among immigrants from the Maghreb;
higher unemployment rates were experienced only by immigrants from Turkey. In contrast,
immigrants from nearby EU countries (e.g. Spain, Portugal, and Italy) experienced
unemployment rates similar to the native population, which was roughly half that of the
Maghrebi immigrants (Bouvier 1-4). Some attempt to explain this disparity by attributing it to
Arabs’ poor French language skills. However, this explanation is not wholly valid, since most of
France’s Arab immigrants come from its former colonies in North Africa, where French is still
spoken (Hargreaves, Immigration 56).
Even when comparably skilled, an Arab worker is almost three times more likely to be
unemployed than a European worker (Hargreaves, Immigration 56). When Arabs are able to find
jobs in France, they are usually in low-skill, low-paying jobs such as construction; this reflects a
similar pattern of employment during the first waves of Arab immigration of the 1950s-1960s
(Hargreaves, Immigration 40). In addition to low salaries, these jobs are characterized by
insecurity, often consisting of short-term projects from which employees are easily fired and
replaced. As the second and third generations of Arabs in France enter the work force, they are
finding the same types of jobs as their parents, thus remaining in the same low-income economic
conditions. In addition to low economic status, Arabs in France also have very low upward
mobility due to French racism and Arab disenfranchisement (Hargreaves, Immigration 50-56).
2.2 Housing
Finding acceptable housing has been a persistent problem for Arabs in France. While this
can be linked to their current poor economic status, during the first waves of Arab immigration,
it was also tied to poor government preparation. For example, in the years after World War II,
France was not prepared for the large influx of immigrants into its country; as a result it suffered
a dire housing shortage. Many immigrants were moved into outlying settlements (bidonvilles),
which in English could be called shantytowns. These settlements often lacked basic amenities
including electricity, running water, and sewers. By the 1960s, at least 75,000 people lived in
bidonvilles, 80% of whom were immigrants. Half of the immigrants living in bidonvilles were
from the Maghreb (Hargreaves, Immigration 68-71). There was at least one slightly better option
for housing overflow; in 1956, Sonacotral (National Society of Construction of Housing for
Algerian Workers) developed hostel accommodations for Algerian workers that offered better
basic facilities than the bidonvilles; however they also separated Algerians geographically from
the rest of the population (Viet 93-95). In 1963, the hostels were expanded to include any foreign
workers, and they continued to be used for many years; by 1990, 100,000 foreigners lived in
these hostels (Hargreaves, Immigration 68-71).
The French government initiated efforts to relieve the housing shortage and eradicate
bidonvilles in the 1970s. The government began to offer increased subsidized, public housing
opportunities, known as HLMs (habitation à loyer modéré, or moderate-rent housing). HLMs
tend to be concentrated in the peripheries of large cities (Viet 93-95) and are mostly inhabited by
immigrants, particularly Arab immigrants. These areas are often called banlieues. A banlieue is
similar in concept to the American ghetto in that it consists of areas of public housing, largely
inhabited by minorities, which often experience high rates of poverty, crime, and violence.
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However, banlieues are generally smaller than American ghettos and have lower rates of poverty
and crime. While American ghettos are located within the inner city, banlieues are located on the
edges of cities. As in the U.S., there is poor transportation between the inner city and the
banlieue, furthering the sense of separation between the two areas and serving as a barrier to
employment, shopping, and social support opportunities. The banlieue has come under increased
scrutiny since the 1990s, when violent confrontations between disenfranchised youth and police
in the area became frequent. The media have heavily covered such confrontations and often
presented it as a problem with the “Arab youth”, further giving the area and the Arabs in it a
reputation for lawlessness (Hargreaves, Immigration 71-75).
3. Public Policy Affecting Arabs
Public policy concerning Arabs has been inconsistent over the years. For example, the
French government has at times (a) ignored Arabs, (b) attempted to send them back to their
countries of origin, and (c) attempted to integrate them into French society. This inconsistency is
due to the alternation of the left and the right political groups holding power in the government
and to varying attitudes of the French people, which often correlate with economic conditions.
As previously noted, the French people assumed before the 1970s that Arab immigrants
were hired temporarily to supply labor; it was largely assumed that they would return to their
countries of origin when they were no longer needed. As a result, Arab immigrants were not the
subject of much public debate. However, following the recession of the 1970s and the increasing
unemployment rates, Arabs were viewed as competitors for increasingly scarce jobs. Thus, the
image of Arabs was now as competitors who had overstayed their welcome (Nielsen 7-8).
Immigration policy is exercised through controls applied to the flow of immigrants, and
integration, which is applied to residents of immigrant origin (Hargreaves, Multi-Ethnic France
175-179). The French government’s approach to labor immigration can be summarized into three
basic periods since 1974. The first period corresponds with Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s
presidency (1974-1981). His center-right government attempted an aggressive approach to
restrict immigration and to send non-European immigrants to their countries of origin through
incentives for leaving and deterrents for settling permanently in France. The second period began
in 1981, when Socialist François Mitterrand took the presidency, and lasted until 1997. During
this period, the government retained strict controls on immigration but shifted its immigration
policy focus from repatriation to integration, with the hope of transforming Arabs into true
French citizens. The right renounced mass repatriation as a goal in 1991, perhaps trying to
distance itself from the FN and recognizing the failure of mass repatriation policies in the past.
However both the left and the right political groups began to show enthusiasm for integrating
Arabs, though the right still supported restrictive citizenship laws. The third period began in
1997, when it became clear that the government’s attempts at integrating Arabs were failing,
perhaps due to the deteriorating economy; as a result, it was believed that anti-discrimination
measures were needed.
3.1 Political Climate of the 1970s-1980s and the Front National
During the 70s, the center-right government sent mixed messages about how it intended to
address Arab immigrant policy. The official policy in the later years was to halt new labor
immigration, but to integrate immigrants already established in France. While the left and right
political groups agreed on these policy goals, they did not agree on how to achieve them (Lochak,
L’immigration 251). For example, the government began to invest more money for improving
the very poor conditions in which most immigrants lived. While the government also prevented
families of immigrant workers from immigrating to France, this was found unlawful under the
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European Convention on Human Rights of 1950. Due to strained economic conditions, including
increasing unemployment rates, the French people were unwilling at that point to accept Arabs
as a permanent part of society; as a result, bitterness against Arabs and their real and perceived
use of French resources grew. By the end of the 1970s, unemployment was the primary concern
of most French people; the French government under Valéry Giscard d’Estaing continually
supported the reduction of the immigrant population as a solution to unemployment; data suggest,
however that it was not able to carry out that reduction with much success (Guiraudon).
In the early 1980s, political party leaders began to compete with one other to find the best
solutions to the problems associated with the Arab population. Many local elections were filled
with debates over how to “handle” Arab immigrants (Lochak, L’immigration 251-252). In 1983,
the Front National (FN) first gained national attention. While the FN had existed since 1972, it
was only in the flurry of concern over Arab immigrants of the early 1980s that the party gained
momentum and popularity. In 1983, the party won 17% of the vote in a local election in Dreux, a
small town in northern France; this was a huge leap from its former obscurity. The FN was
founded under Jean-Marie Le Pen, who continued to lead the party until his resignation in 2011,
when his daughter Marine Le Pen assumed leadership. This far-right political party, whose
platform is based on preserving the “purity” of French culture, supports measures to remove nonEuropeans from France and exclude foreigners and immigrants from French nationality and its
accompanying benefits (Bréchon and Mitra 63-65; “L’Internaute: Histoire”).
Though other political parties view the FN as an unacceptably extreme party, the growing
support that the FN received forced other parties to respond to FN’s immigration agenda and to
address the fears of the public. While other parties felt pressure to support tougher immigration
controls, they found this difficult to do while also trying to avoid appearing racist or xenophobic
(Lochak, L’immigration 251-253). Party leaders on the right struggled with how to address the
FN, which was shunned for its extremism, yet was gaining support and stealing voters from the
center-right. Leaders fluctuated between making political deals with the FN, stealing ideas from
the FN, and opposing the FN. At the national level, where the party was shunned, party leaders
refused to make any open deals with the FN; however, at the local level, leaders were more
willing to compromise. Throughout the 1980s, many local elections were won by alliances
between the FN and center-right parties. When the right regained power in the national
government in the 1990s, an increase in immigration legislation was executed in an attempt to
lure back FN supporters (Bréchon and Mitra 63-66).
3.2 The Right’s Control Policy in the 1970s
In terms of controlling immigration, the government has exercised two main tools:
regulation of admission into France and limits on the duration of residence allowed. Along with
limits on duration, on several occasions the government has changed the terms under which
repatriation is required. For example, before 1981 the center-right government exercised strict
control over immigration by attempting to end labor migration and family reunification. Though
the government did not succeed in these efforts, it placed many obstacles for reunification for
labor immigrants and their families. The unsuccessful policy of aide au retour (aid to return),
whereby financial incentives were offered to immigrants who agreed to return to their countries
of origin, also qualifies as a control measure. Another attempt to control immigration during the
1970s included executive orders that were created to reduce the number of work permits
provided to immigrants and to deport unemployed immigrants (Guiraudon). The Conseil d’État
(France’s highest court) declared this order unlawful; despite this, in 1979 the government tried
to achieve the same results by drafting similar legislation titled the Bonnet law of 1980. This
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legislation restricted entry and residence rights for immigrants. Significantly, the law made it
legal to hold foreigners in custody for a week while deportation orders were pending (Lochak,
The Bounds of Freedom). The facilitation of holding and deporting foreigners was a sign of the
growing French fear of Arabs as threats to French society and, perhaps more importantly, as
threats to the French economy.
3.3 The Left’s Control Policy Starting in 1981
When the left took control of the government in 1981 and started a more liberal approach
to immigration policy, the use of restrictive controls was greatly reduced. The official
government discourse shifted radically and ceased to emphasize the expulsion of immigrants.
Instead, the government discontinued administrative expulsions and required court orders for
most deportations. Measures were also passed to protect many immigrants from expulsion. For
example, young immigrants who had spent the majority of their lives in France were protected
from deportation. The government also granted amnesty for immigrants who had entered the
country illegally before 1981, as long as they were employed (Lochak, L’immigration 251-253).
As a result of this new policy, 132,000 immigrants were made legal citizens of France. In 1983,
the government passed a law which simplified the renewal of work and residence permits by
combining them into automatically renewable ten-year permits and granting them to most of the
legal immigrants in France. Before this law, the renewal of permits was a confusing process and
a source of anxiety to many immigrants (Martinez 36).
Despite the impressive amount of liberal immigration legislation during this period, the
government still maintained strict control in certain aspects of immigration policy. For instance,
the government implemented harsher penalties for employers who hired illegal immigrants;
deportations of immigrants who were determined a threat to the public order became more
frequent in 1983. The government also reintroduced repatriation incentives in the form of aide à
la réinsertion (aid for reinsertion) in 1984. In addition, the government complicated family
reunification by introducing requirements of certain housing conditions, which were difficult for
many immigrants to meet (Hargreaves, Multi-Ethnic France 177-180). Thus, while the left
fostered an overall liberal phase of immigration policy and control, it was influenced by the
previous government and the persistent fears of the public concerning immigration.
3.4 The Right’s Control Policy from 1986 Onward
In 1986, conservative Jacques Chirac became Prime Minister, and the right regained power
in the government. This led to another period of tightening immigration control. The parties of
the right attempted unsuccessfully to revise the nationality code in 1986, under the premise that
French nationality should be restricted to those who truly want it—an idea that implies that some
people who had obtained French nationality did not appreciate or deserve it. The exposé des
motifs (the explanation of the bill’s purposes) states: “It is agreed that, henceforth, to insure that
the acquisition of French nationality corresponds to a genuine will of those concerned ... We
must avoid integrating people who do not actually desire it or who are not aware of having
become French” (Lochak, L’immigration 255). 1
Interior Minister Charles Pasqua initiated legislation that would restore executive control
over deportations based on the threat of immigrants to the public order. The legislation, known
as the Pasqua Law, placed more restrictions on obtaining the ten-year residence and work
permits, and made more immigrants vulnerable to deportation. It also gave more powers to the
police to regulate immigration and deportation. In 1988, Socialist Pierre Joxe assumed the
1

Quotations from French sources are my own translations.
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Interior Minister position and managed to reverse some of Pasqua’s measures. However, the
reversal was short-lived. In 1993, Pasqua became Interior Minister again and introduced the New
Pasqua Laws, which consisted of harsh anti-immigration measures. The laws reinforced his
previous legislation and placed strict restrictions on family reunification. The Pasqua laws had
such a negative effect on immigrants and on the image of the French government that they were
reversed in 1997. Still, the right persisted in tightening control in the 2000s, when Nicolas
Sarkozy (Minister of the Interior at that time) initiated policy to encourage the immigration of
professionals and to discourage immigration related to family reunification.
Following Sarkozy’s presidency in 2007, the Minister of Immigration and Integration,
Brice Hortefeux, continued Sarkozy’s projects with the Hortefeux Law, which increased
restrictions on entrance into France (Edmiston and Duménil 232-237). In early 2012, Sarkozy
reiterated his wish to reduce immigration. On the television show, “Des paroles et des actes”
(“Words and Acts”), Sarkozy noted that if reelected in May, “During my term, I think that in
order to bring integration back into a good condition, we must divide the number of people that
we receive in half, that is to say, to go from 180,000 per year to about 100,000”. He also
proposed ideas such as a mandatory test of French language skills for foreigners immigrating to
join family members or marrying a French citizen (Jarry and Le Guernigou). Thus, despite the
heightened popularity of anti-racism movements in the 90s, the right has continued to support
strict immigration control.
3.5 Integration Policy: Ambiguous in the 1970s
The application of integration measures has fluctuated greatly over the years. In the 1970s,
the government sent mixed messages to its people by funding improvements in housing for
immigrants but by also encouraging repatriation. No specific agent existed for immigrants until
Antoine Postel-Vinay was appointed Minister of State for Immigrant Workers in 1974. PostelVinay ended the recruitment of labor immigrants. He attempted to improve conditions for
immigrants in France by improving their housing options; however he resigned from his post
after his efforts failed. Paul Dijoud assumed the post in 1974 and perpetuated the mixed signals
the government sent to immigrants. He strongly encouraged repatriation by encouraging
immigrants to retain their original cultures and discouraging their integration into French society.
At the same time, he secured funding increases for immigrant housing, which implied that he
welcomed the permanent settlement of immigrants, or perhaps simply accepted that they might
not leave. To oversee the use of these funds, the Commission Nationale pour le Logement des
Immigrés (CNLI: The National Commission for the Housing of Immigrants) was created. Some
of the money raised in this way was used to construct or refurbish hostels for single immigrant
workers; however the majority of funds were used to build public housing. At this time
immigrants were relocated from the shantytowns to disadvantaged urban areas that would
become the banlieue. Unfortunately, immigrant-housing funds were often misdirected and
misused. For instance, some of the funding was used to refurbish or construct homes for nonimmigrants. As a result, many immigrants frequently ended up living in the least desirable homes
and areas of the public housing. Because of the high rate of misuse, the proportion of funds
directed to immigrant housing was reduced and then abolished in 1987 (Viet 100-103).
In the late 1970s, the government began to encourage immigrants to keep in touch with
their native cultures. While this could be interpreted as a precedent to the multiculturalism
movement and a positive statement about the value of foreign cultures. considering the French
preoccupation with unified culture and tradition, it is more logical that the true motivation was
the hope that immigrants could eventually be repatriated. For successful repatriation, an
INQUIRY, Volume 13
Published by ScholarWorks@UARK, 2012

89

7

Inquiry: The University of Arkansas Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 13 [2012], Art. 9

FRENCH: Carissa Porter
immigrant must still feel connected to his native culture, or he will not feel comfortable returning
to it (Hargreaves, Multi-Ethnic France 182-185).
As part of the promotion of immigrant culture, the new Minister of Immigrant Workers,
Lionel Stoléru, created an advisory commission to consider the cultural needs of minority
immigrant groups. In 1977, a weekly television show called “Mosaïque” (“Mosaic”) was
introduced. “Mosaïque” was a show designed for children, but specifically targeted at immigrant
children. It featured different cultural traditions, with an emphasis on those of the Maghreb. In
another effort to keep immigrant children in touch with their native cultures, the French
government made agreements about language instruction with some sending states (immigrants’
home countries). The agreements allowed sending states to fund a limited number of classes in
their emigrants’ native languages in French public schools (Hargreaves, Multi-Ethnic France
180-185).
3.6 Integration in the 1980s: Integration and Multiculturalism
In the mid-1980s, when it was evident that the Arab population was settling permanently in
France, the newly left-ruled government shifted its focus from repatriation to integration. Under
Franҫois Mitterrand, the government’s powers of expulsion were somewhat reduced. The beur
identity began to materialize during this time, and numerous famous anti-racism marches took
place in the mid-80s. However, integration continued to be a troublesome issue for the French,
who wanted to avoid their former colonial image of cultural dominator, but who also placed
great value on unity and cultural, racial, and ethnic “purity” (Bleich, Anti-Racism 173-174). In
other words, if too much emphasis is placed on the distinctness of a culture or ethnicity, the
French consider it a threat to their cultural unity and republican values. Ethnic separatism is such
an issue that there is even a specific word for it in French: communautarisme. Communautarisme
was also linked to the reform of the nationality code and the emerging dichotomy between “good”
and “bad” immigrants. “Good” immigrants were those who were legal, employed, and adapted to
French culture. “Bad” immigrants were defined as illegal, likely unemployed, and individuals
who prevented other immigrants from integrating well (Lochak, The Bounds of Freedom 253254).
3.7 Integration from the 1990s Onward
At the beginning of the 1990s, the left still held power in the government. This political
party was enthusiastic about integration, though the leaders in the right still spoke of the need to
control the immigrant “invasions” (Lochak, L’immigration 257). Prime Minister Edith Cresson
strategically chose Kofi Yamgnane to be the Minister of State for Integration. Yamgnane was
born in Togo and had become a successful politician in France. He was also Catholic and not
particularly friendly toward Islam. He was thus a clear symbol of successful integration since
Yamgnane was able to remain connected to his native culture while adapting to key aspects of
French culture. Moreover, he became an important part of French society through politics; as
such, this made him a prime candidate to facilitate integration for other immigrants (“L’Ouest en
mémoire”).
After the Pasqua laws of 1993, the Arab community became increasingly frustrated with its
political, economic and cultural situation in France. Tensions rose in the banlieue between Arab
youth and police, and riots occurred. The people of France were shocked by the grim situation,
and the public spotlight turned to the problem of racism in the country. Before the 1990s, the
French were fairly oblivious to their racism. With public attention turning to Arabs, however, the
level of discrimination they faced became apparent. The public began to see how discrimination
and racism against Arabs provoked anger and resentment, subsequently creating the threat to the
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public order France was currently facing. That threat to the public order came to be called
insécurité (insecurity), a concept that encompassed fears for personal safety and the safety of
society as a whole. Insécurité grew in the 1990s as violent confrontations occurred between Arab
youth and police; petty and violent crimes were committed by socially and economically
disadvantaged youth, and French-Arab youths participated in Islamic terrorist bombings. The
government tried to combat these problems by reinforcing police forces in the banlieue; however
most politicians realized that discrimination was the root problem. Integration could not move
forward as long as severe discrimination remained (Hargreaves, Multi-Ethnic France 186-190).
At the same time, public sympathy for illegal immigrants grew as awareness of racism rose
and Arabs gained more of a public voice through media such as the popular movie La Haine
(Hate), which depicted the struggles of minorities in the banlieue. Both the left and right
attempted to be viewed as more moderate on immigration issues. In 1997, Interior Minister JeanPierre Chevènement said in an interview with Le Monde: “I am convinced that there is room for
an immigration policy that is generous but firm, in keeping with the national interest, upon which
a vast majority of our fellow-citizens can be united in consent” (Lochak, L’immigration 259).
Also in 1997, the government called upon political scientist Patrick Weil to develop new
regulations for the entrance and residence of foreigners in France. The regulations were to be
simple, realistic, and humane. It was in this process of reforming the immigration and nationality
laws that the government repealed the Pasqua Laws (Lochak, L’immigration 259-260). Thus, the
mixed government of the late 1990s demonstrated growing sympathy for the immigrants of
France.
3.8 Ethnic Monitoring
The increasing focus on immigration policy reveals a French struggle that is linked to the
situation of Arabs and other minorities. In France, official recognition of different ethnic groups
had historically been considered taboo. In the past, France had scoffed at the American and
British approaches to ethnicity and race relations. To the French, American and British policies
encouraged communautarisme and demonstrated opposition to the French goal of unified
integration. Recognizing ethnicity was and continues to be considered contrary to the French
values of equality and laïcité (the key French value of secularism), which the French interpret as
an official blindness to differences such as religion and ethnicity. While Americans idealize the
celebration of diversity, the French avoid even acknowledging differences. Furthermore, ethnic
recognition is associated with painful memories of the Holocaust and the Vichy regime (when
the French government kept official records on Jews and minorities and used them to cooperate
with Hitler). Thus, any form of ethnic monitoring or recognition of ethnicity has traditionally
been forbidden (Bleich, Social Research 66).
Considering the French aversion to British-style racial and ethnic recognition, it was
considered shocking to the French people when the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (HCI) reported
in 1998 that Britain’s Commission for Racial Equality might be a good model for addressing
discrimination and inequality. While the HCI was interested in creating a similar independent
body to address race relations, it did not develop one at the time (Garbaye); instead, a free
hotline was created through which people could report discrimination to authorities.
Unfortunately, the authorities were not at all prepared to handle the volume of complaints
received. The hotline instead referred callers to regional citizenship commissions, who in turn
referred callers to immigration or racism-based Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). This
inadequate response only led to further disillusionment among Arabs about the state’s desire and
its ability to improve race relations (Lépinard and Simon 12).
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In 2005, Prime Minister de Villepin appointed Azouz Begag as Minister for Equal
Opportunities. Like Kofi Yamgnane, Begag was a strategic politician. Born in Lyon to Algerian
parents, Begag became a successful researcher, writer, and politician; he wrote several books
about multiculturalism and ethnicity in France. As such, Begag was considered the perfect
candidate to represent successful Arab integration into French society (Gazsi). Begag has
favored ethnic monitoring and other proactive measures as a way to enforce equality laws,
though many other members of the government still resist these ideas. In his book Ethnicity &
Equality, Begag describes how France could benefit from systems that encourage “social mixing”
and provide more opportunities to ethnic youth, with the help of ethnic monitoring (Begag).
President Nicolas Sarkozy has been unclear about his position on ethnic monitoring. In
2003, when he was Minister of the Interior, he expressed support not just for ethnic monitoring,
but also for positive discrimination (policies that privilege historically disadvantaged groups; i.e.,
affirmative action). While he initially noted that France needed more Muslims in senior
professional and public positions, he recanted two years later, suggesting that positive
discrimination should be territorially-based, not ethnically- or religiously-based (Bleich, Social
Research 67).
Though Sarkozy did not introduce any new principles in ethnic monitoring, he did oversee
increasing equality measures, which indirectly benefited Arabs. One area of improvement
involved the grandes écoles, the most prestigious universities in France. The vast majority of
students in the grandes écoles are from wealthy families who spend thousands of dollars on
preparatory courses; entry into the schools is highly competitive and graduates of the grandes
écoles are historically guaranteed good jobs. To address the inequality of access to the grandes
écoles, the Institut d’Études Politiques (the grande école of political science) created an
additional method of entry for high school students from Zones d’Éducation Prioritaires
(ZEPSs) whereby they write and defend two papers instead of taking an entrance exam, the
content of which is suggested to be biased against immigrants. While this new method did not
explicitly target Arabs, it did primarily benefit Arabs and other minorities, since they are the
main residents of ZEPs. Since its implementation, at least two-thirds of students admitted
through this method are comprised of minorities; several other schools later enacted similar
practices (Bleich, Social Research 67-68).
Sarkozy also supported positive discrimination and other policies that benefit low-income
youth, specifically through preparatory courses for entry into civil service employment. His
suggestion follows the pattern of indirectly trying to reverse racism by targeting disadvantaged
areas. This supports the taboo of directly addressing race and ethnicity by basing measures on
territory (Bleich Social Research 67-68).
With the May 2012 election of Socialist President François Hollande, it is unclear how
policy affecting Arabs will change. Hollande has avoided making explicit statements about his
stance on immigration, but it appears he holds views similar to his predecessor. Although he has
criticized Sarkozy and conservatives for moving too closely to the extreme right, he has also said
he will uphold enforcement of the burqa ban and limits on economic immigration (Sage).
However, as a member of the Socialist Party, he may face increased pressure from his party to
liberalize his policies.
3.9 ZEPs
Zones d’Éducation Prioritaires (Priority Education Zones) are defined as disadvantaged
zones whereby public schools receive extra state resources. The zones were created in 1982 in
response to high rates of academic failure among disadvantaged students in urban areas; ZEPs
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were designed to improve education. Interestingly, the criteria for being recognized as a ZEP
contain an ethnic factor; the guidelines for selection as a ZEP are loosely based (among other
factors) on rates of unemployment, blue-collar jobs held, and notably, the number of families
with non-European members. To combat the problems of high dropout rates and poor exam
scores, ZEP schools receive extra teachers, funding, and other benefits (Bénabou, Kramarz, and
Prost 3-4). The ZEP program attests to the value the French place in their education system, for
the French view the public school as the place where republican values are instilled in children.
Thus, when faced with the difficulty of integrating large numbers of Arabs into French society,
they turn to the school to help prepare foreign children to be successful French citizens.
3.10 Halal Controversy
Recently, halal food has gained national attention—a development Americans might find
puzzling, since the preparation methods of food are not of great concern to most in the U.S. In
Arabic, “halal” means “permissible” according to Islamic law. The Quran gives certain dietary
guidelines for halal food. According to the Quran, Muslims cannot eat pork, and any animal that
a Muslim eats must be slaughtered in a certain way. In addition, the animal’s meat must not
come into contact with any non-halal food. In 2010, the French burger chain Quick began
serving halal hamburgers in 8 out of its 366 restaurants; they also stopped serving bacon burgers
and started using halal meat. The decision increased its number of Muslim customers, but it also
caused controversy among non-Muslims. Some politicians claimed the halal menu was a threat
to France’s Christian culture and to laïcité; they also believed that the new menus were exclusive
to non-Muslims.
In response to public outrage, FN staged a protest and FN leader Marine Le Pen
suggested that a tax should be collected from Islamic certification organizations. Authorities in
one northern city opened a criminal investigation on Quick. The chain offered a compromise in
which customers could also order non-halal burgers, and the mayor withdrew his complaint.
Other politicians attempted to force the chain to serve both halal and non-halal meat. This was
despite the fact that there is no significant taste or texture difference between the two types of
meat, and it is not economically efficient to store and prepare the two types of meat separately
(Seelow). In response, a Muslim consumer website suggested that the negative reaction was due
entirely to anti-Islamic sentiments. Since there are many other restaurants that cater to niche
markets and exclude others, such as Mexican, Chinese, or “green” restaurants, the writer
questioned the claim that communautarisme is the problem (“Al-Kantz”).
Halal food has also been a point of contention in public schools. There are currently no
public schools that offer halal options in their cafeterias. In August 2011, a statement from the
Minister of the Interior reported, “The school cafeteria is an optional public service ... providing
menus accommodating religious practices constitutes neither a right for the users nor an
obligation for the community” (“Aufait Maroc”). In early 2012, Marine Le Pen provoked a
debate among politicians by announcing that she wants to ban halal in school cafeterias (“Aufait
Maroc”). Her statement spurred some other politicians to show that they, too, oppose halal. In
March, Prime Minister Fillon criticized the observance of halal and kosher regulations by saying
that they are ancestral traditions with no relevance in modern society. His criticism drew outrage
from Jewish and Muslim organizations. President Sarkozy expressed his opposition to halal in
cafeterias and has supported clearer labeling of halal meat so that non-Muslims will not
accidentally purchase it (Foulkes).
On the other hand, some politicians, including conservatives, have taken the opportunity
to show their openness to Islam. Salima Saa, member of the Union for a Popular Movement
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(UMP) and daughter of a harki (Muslim Algerians who supported France during the Algerian
War and subsequently fled to France), stated that she was “saddened to see the spread of
negative and devaluing judgments of the Muslims of France” (Foulkes). Still others have
distanced themselves from the debate or attempted to minimize its importance. For example,
Minister of Foreign Affairs Alain Juppé stated, “I think that the problem of halal meat is in
reality a false problem, that there are other true questions that must be raised” (Foulkes). The
various responses reflect the still unsettled French approach to Islam.
4. Arabs in the U.S.A.
4.1 History of Arab Migration into America
The situation of Arab Americans is quite different than that of Arabs in France. 2 The U.S.
began as a country of immigrants and has based much of its identity on that concept, though new
immigrant groups have always faced discrimination after arrival. This suggests a different
attitude toward immigrants than in France, which for much of its history was a fairly
homogenous nation, both culturally and racially. In addition to America’s distinct identity as an
immigrant nation, the conditions of Arab immigration into the U.S. have been different from
those in France; this influences how relations between Arab Americans and the U.S. develop.
The earliest wave of Arab immigrants came to America in the late 1800s-1920s. Unlike
France, there was no great labor demand drawing Arabs to the country. Most early immigrants
were Christians from villages in Greater Syria, as opposed to France’s largely Muslim Algerian
immigrants. Like France’s Arab immigrants, they were comprised of generally poor, semi- or
unskilled workers who obtained low-paying jobs. However, most of the immigrants’ loyalties
were to their home villages rather than their native country or Arab culture in general, so they did
not form a unified community like other immigrant groups in America, such as the Italians or the
Irish. Because they did not form a conspicuous community, and because they were mostly
Christian, Arab immigrants provoked fewer xenophobic reactions in America than Arabs in
France (Samhan 11-27).
Moreover, the U.S. had had minimal relations with the Arab world in the early 1900s, so
it lacked the tense backdrop of colonialism that France shared with North Africa. However, this
time period (1880s-1920s) coincided with a rise in American nativism, which resulted in
increased xenophobia toward all immigrant groups. The rise in nativism was due to the
decreased demand for labor and the increased number of immigrants from poorly understood
cultures, such as Southern and Eastern Europe. Many Americans began to blame immigrants for
the social problems of their day, including ghettos, crime, poverty, corruption, labor unrest, and
radical ideologies. Of the immigrant groups, the Chinese were considered the “most foreign,”
and Syrians were the second “most foreign” due to differences in their culture and physical
appearance.
In the early 1900s, several laws were passed to restrict immigration, especially from Asia.
One law was titled the Johnson Reed Act of 1924, which specified annual immigration quotas of
only one percent of the existing immigrant community of 1920. At the same time, many
Americans were confused about exactly who or what Arabs were in terms of culture, race, and
ethnicity. For example, during these years, disputes arose regarding whether Syrians should be
awarded citizenship because it was unclear whether they were Asian (non-white) or white. Arabs
were also frequently mistaken for other ethnicities such as Italian, Spaniard, Portuguese, Turk, or
2

The terminology is perhaps even more complicated when it comes to describing Arabs in America. It might be
more fitting to frame this section in terms of America’s conflicts with the Islamic World rather than the Arab World,
but I have chosen to keep my focus on Arabs for the sake of consistency.
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Jew, as evidenced by the fact that ethnic slurs for those groups were often used for Arabs as well.
Nevertheless, the first generation of Arab immigrants continued to integrate successfully, and by
the 1920s, the second generation had been born in America and was being raised in assimilation
with other American children. Thus, Arab integration into America progressed relatively
successfully (Samhan 11-27).
The Arab situation in the U.S. changed with the second wave of immigration in the 1950s
and 1960s. These immigrants consisted primarily of individuals fleeing economic and political
crises in the Middle East. They were very different from earlier Arab immigrants in that they
identified as Muslim, consisted of middle-and upper income households, and were more attached
to their native cultural identities. Unlike the early, disorganized immigrant groups, they formed
groups based on regional loyalty and identity. The issue of Israel was and remains a critical
element in the Arab American identity.
After the Arab-Israeli Wars in 1967 and 1973, a stereotype arose in America of Arabs as
fanatic terrorists. Many Arabs found themselves in disagreement with the American support of
the Israeli state’s creation, which helped to unify Arab Americans as a group. The increased
organization and visibility of Arab American groups led to increased general American
awareness of their existence, which led to more pronounced stereotypes. In addition, the media
began to portray Arabs as “villainous, greedy, blood-thirsty, or dangerous” (Samhan 11-18).
4.2 Political Exclusion
Samhan argues that Arab opposition to the creation of Israel was in fact the cause of a
particular kind of discrimination Arab Americans face, which she calls political exclusion. Arab
Americans who voiced their support for Palestine or their disagreement with the American
government were regarded as highly suspicious. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI) monitored many Arab American groups, including the Association of ArabAmerican University Graduates and individual political activists. Arabs seeking visas to the U.S.
were carefully screened and questioned in regard to their political opinions. These measures were
meant to prevent Arab terrorism, which was increasing in the Middle East. At the same time,
Americans generally ignored Israeli acts against Palestinians that could qualify as terroristic,
while focusing on Arab terrorist acts against Israelis reflecting a bias in favor of Israelis over
Arabs and a refusal to recognize Israeli fault. This time period produced an ongoing legacy of
associating Arabs with terrorism and the acceptability of viewing any politically active Arab as a
security threat (Samhan 11-27).
4.3 Socioeconomic Status of American Arabs
This type of exclusionary or political racism in the U.S. is very different from the type of
political racism Arabs in France experience. It is important to distinguish this from the
“pervasive, societal discrimination” that other minorities, such as African Americans, have faced
in America (Samhan 27). Primary evidence of the difference between the types of racism is the
socioeconomic status of Arab Americans and the fact that Arab Americans were not originally
brought to this country as slaves. In contrast to Arabs in France who are generally poor,
uneducated, and who hold low-paying, blue-collar jobs, Arab Americans often are of higher
economic status than the average non-Arab American. In the early 1980s, over half of Arab
Americans had some higher education, as opposed to only a third of Americans in general. In
addition, 61% of Arab Americans held white-collar jobs, compared with only 49% of Americans
(Nigem 638-639). Even now, after the September 11th attacks, these statistics are almost the
same. According to recent American Community Survey results, the median income for an Arab
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American household is $59,012 and $52,029 for all American households (“Arab American
Institute”).
Whatever racism against Arab Americans exists in the U.S., it does not prevent them
from succeeding financially. As Samhan argues, Arab Americans are able to succeed because the
racism directed against them is mostly limited to the political realm. Arab Americans who have
become involved in politics are usually Christians; most have also been born and raised in the
U.S. and do not emphasize their heritage. While in general, this remains true today, some
changes are taking place. In January 2007, Keith Ellison became the first Muslim to be elected to
Congress. Ellison is not of Arab descent, but the election of a Muslim to such a high office bodes
well for Muslim Arab Americans. He quickly provoked controversy when he chose to be sworn
into office with a Quran, rather than a Bible. Not to be dissuaded, he was sworn in using a Quran
once owned by Thomas Jefferson. In his 2009 speech at Cairo, President Obama cited Ellison’s
ceremony with Jefferson’s Quran as an example of the positive relationship between Islam and
America (Obama). Ellison’s experience shows that America is making progress in reducing
xenophobia toward Arabs and Muslims; however Arab Americans and Muslims who become
involved in politics still risk drawing negative attention and racist or xenophobic criticism.
4.4 “Othering” of Arabs in America
Unfortunately, the suspicions, fears, and misunderstandings that some Americans felt
toward Arabs, even Arab Americans, were aggravated by the September 11th attacks. Salaita
argues that the attacks made American attitudes more extreme, no matter how they viewed Arab
Americans prior to the attacks. For instance, Americans who already tended to be racist or
xenophobic found justification in the attacks and encouragement to be more aggressive; those
who already supported multiculturalism used a backlash against the former group’s outbursts to
further campaign against exclusion and inequality. On the one hand, there were outpourings of
sympathy toward Arab Americans in the time after the attacks; on the other, an insidious
“us/them” vocabulary quickly developed. For example, Congressman Howard Coble discussed
the possibility of internment of Arab Americans on a radio call-in show. He reasoned, “some of
these Arab Americans are probably intent on doing harm to us” (Salaita 158). It is significant
that even though he acknowledges the group’s status as Americans, he sets them against the “us”
of Americans in general, implying they are not truly part of the American group. This vocabulary
permeated even the discourse of Americans who tried to encourage acceptance and sympathy
toward Arab Americans. Often, such encouragements would contain the ideas that “Arab
Americans are just like us,” and “They love this country just as much as we do.” While positive
on the surface, these statements perpetuate the “us/them” divide. Instead of acknowledging them
as true members of the American group, such statements maintain the idea that Arab Americans
are a group separate from other Americans (Salaita 146-161).
At the same time, the U.S. government has taken advantage of popular fears in the wake
of September 11th to justify much interference with the privacy of its citizens, especially Arab
Americans. Salaita claims that the government not only took advantage of such fears, but also
purposely induced them so that it could then engage in practices such as ethnic profiling,
surveillance, citizen spying, and detention (Salaita 159).
5. Conclusion
The idea of Arab threat is where American attitudes are most similar to the French,
though the fear is projected differently. Both nations view their culture as exceptional and in
need of protection. Both nations perceive Arabs as threats to those cultures, and justify intrusive
laws and practices. To the French, conspicuous visual markers of loyalty to another culture, and
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especially to a culture in which religion plays a major role, are seen as a threat to French culture.
The French focus on the hijab in public and now halal as well. To Americans, the primary
concern is dissent from the government, particularly in matters of security or the Middle East.
Thus, they are suspicious of Arabs who oppose America’s support of Israel or question security
measures. France and the U.S. have troubled relations with Arabs despite their efforts to be
positive players in the Arab world because they have not overcome their xenophobic suspicions
and fears about Arabs, which stem from their recent colonial and political histories, respectively.
Despite the similarities, the problems faced by Arabs in France and America are quite
different. Until the past few decades, Americans had little experience with Arabs. When more
Arabs began to immigrate to the U.S, they were politically, not economically motivated. As a
result, they did not provoke resentment for “stealing” jobs, and they were not associated with
low socioeconomic status. This contrasts with the poor Arabs who migrated to France in large
numbers and who vied for low-paying jobs. These conditions set the background for the current
issues involving Arabs in both countries. In America, Arabs face less everyday discrimination
than in France. There are no proposed laws banning the hijab, and halal is almost nonexistent on
the public debate radar. In areas sensitive to security issues (e.g., airports), Arabs may be seen as
a threat due to the ignorant perception that all Arabs are potential terrorists, but this is not a
problem of everyday life for Arabs. The opposite is true in France. Arabs are not recognized as
physical threats in the form of terrorists, but as figurative threats to French culture. During the
colonial era, the French began to see Islam as fundamentally opposed to laïcité, and hijab dress
emerged as a focal point of French fear and suspicion. The French felt threatened by hijab in
Algeria because they could not control it. Hijab in that context also incited French unease
because of its symbolic defiance against the West and its support of Algerian nationalism. That
unease continues today, the same symbolic struggle transplanted into mainland France.
Once Americans understand the complicated history of Franco-Arab relations, they can
understand how the hijab has assumed such importance as a symbol of Franco-Arab conflict, to
the point of sparking a national controversy lasting almost two decades. Americans should
observe and learn from French policies and their results. Issues such as illegal immigration are of
growing concern in America, and it would be wise to take note of which actions have succeeded
and which have failed in France, particularly if a situation as divisive as the hijab controversy is
to be avoided.
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